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Abstract : 
 
There is growing interest in the analysis and measurement of social exclusion, to complement the static and 
dynamic literature on income poverty. On theoretical grounds, social exclusion and income poverty are seen 
as different processes, but with closely interrelated dynamics. However, our empirical understanding of the 
way these two processes dynamically interact at the individual level is still very limited. To shed some light 
on the issue, we use a dynamic bivariate probit model, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and 
Wooldridge (2005)-type initial conditions. Both first and second order Markov dynamics are examined. We 
estimate the model using the Italian sample of the ECHP, waves 1-8, and find a sizable extent of state 
dependence in both poverty and social exclusion. Moreover, there are dynamic cross-effects, implying that 
poverty and social exclusion are mutually reinforcing. Social policies aimed at eradicating poverty and 
avoiding individuals’ social and economic marginalization should take these interaction effects explicitly 
into account. 
 
 
Keywords: poverty dynamics, social exclusion, state dependence, dynamic bivariate probit model with 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years a growing interest in the measurement and analysis of social exclusion has emerged, to 
complement the static and dynamic literature on income poverty. The deep economic and social 
transformations in Western countries, as well as decades of theoretical and empirical research, have 
contributed to a wider appreciation that human deprivations cannot only be related to a lack of financial 
resources. The increase in job precariousness and in labour market segmentation, the intensification of 
migration flows, the weakening of family ties and growing individualism, a rising violation of human rights 
and a decline in social and political participation, all show the inadequacy of the standard measures of 
poverty to describe the new reality and call for different and broader concepts of deprivation, encompassing 
economic dimensions but also social and political aspects of the individuals’ life.  
Social exclusion has been defined as a process that, fully or partially, excludes individuals or groups 
from social, economic and cultural networks and has been linked to the idea of citizenship (Lee-Murie, 
1999). Atkinson (1998) suggested three key elements in order to identify socially excluded individuals: 
relativity, agency and dynamics. Social exclusion involves the ‘exclusion’ of people from a particular 
society, so to judge if a person is excluded or not, we have to observe the person relative to the context of the 
rest of the society s/he lives in. Moreover, exclusion implies a voluntary act (agency) and depends on how 
situations and circumstances develop (dynamic process). Another essential characteristic of social exclusion 
is its multidimensional nature. In fact, the European Commission (1992 and 1993) suggests that ''The concept 
of social exclusion is a dynamic one, referring both to processes and consequent situations... it also states out 
the multidimensional nature of the mechanisms whereby individuals and groups are excluded from taking 
part in social exchanges, from the component practices and rights of social integration and identity... it even 
goes beyond participation in working life: it is felt and shown in the fields of housing, education, health and 
access to services”. The identification of the relevant aspects of social exclusion is still being debated, even if 
we have recently observed considerable advances in its measurement (Bossert et al., 2005; D’ambrosio and 
Chakravarty, 2006), in the empirical identification of the socially excluded (Whelan et al., 2002; Tsakloglou 
and Papadopoulos, 2002a and 2002b), or in the study of the dynamics of social exclusion (Poggi, 2007a and 
2007b; Poggi and Ramos 2007).  
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In most, if not all, theoretical discourses on the subject, social exclusion and poverty are seen as 
different processes, leading to different states, with different implications and arising from a non-complete 
overlapping set of factors (e.g., Burchardt, 2000). The distinction is made with even greater emphasis if 
poverty is simply defined in terms of income insufficiency. For example, Atkinson (1998) points out that the 
process leading to exclusion from the labour market (exclusion from a desirable status: active participation in 
the society) may arise, under certain circumstances, from the operation of a social security system which 
induces people to reject labour market participation. However, exclusion from the labour market does not 
necessarily imply poverty, for example when the system provides generous social security benefits or if 
those out of employment can resort to their family’s resources to maintain their standard of living. For 
another example, immigrants may be excluded from vote and local/neighbour organizations but they could 
have an income above the poverty line; conversely, they may have low incomes but be well integrated in 
their local communities and have developed a series of ‘coping strategies’ and informal networks aimed at 
maintaining an acceptable standard of living and participation status, despite their low income.  
At the same time, while distinct, it is generally held that the two processes are characterized by an 
interrelated dynamics. Unfortunately, our empirical understanding (and empirical literature) on the way these 
two processes dynamically interact at the individual level is very limited. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute in filling this gap. In order to do so, we construct indicators for both poverty and social exclusion 
at the individual level and examine the dynamics of both, separately and jointly. We do not propose any new 
approach to the measurement of income poverty or social exclusion. We define poverty in terms of low 
income and look at the individual’s longitudinal experiences of poverty, closely following the definitions 
adopted in a large body of the literature (e.g., Addabbo, 2000; Jenkins, 2000; Biewen, 2006; Cantò-Sanchez, 
2002; Devicienti, 2002). The literature on social exclusion is comparatively smaller and there is even less 
consensus on how the concept is to be operationalized in an empirical analysis. In this paper we define social 
exclusion following the recent work of Poggi (2007a). While some of our definitional choices may not 
command universal support, referring to existing approaches has the advantage that we can focus on our 
main objective in this paper: shedding some light on the way the past history of the two processes affect each 
other at the individual level and in a dynamic context. While a few papers have separately studied the 
dynamics of low income (e.g., Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004) and social exclusion (Poggi, 2007a), and some 
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have analyzed the interrelated dynamics of some dimensions of social exclusion (e.g., Stewart, 2005, on low-
pay and employment), we are unaware of any econometric attempt of characterizing the joint dynamics of 
overall indicators of income poverty and social exclusion. 
In order to do so, we use a dynamic bivariate probit model, incorporating unobserved heterogeneity 
and initial conditions, similar to the model of Alessie et al. (2004).  Instead of their treatment of the initial 
conditions, however, we propose to extend the approach of Wooldridge (2005) to our bivariate case. Not 
only is the resulting estimator simpler to implement – which implies non-negligible savings in computing 
time in large datasets like our own; our approach does also more readily extend to higher order dynamics.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on Italy, using data from waves 1-8 of the European Community 
Household Survey (1994-2001). Unlike other OECD countries, this is a country whose dynamics of both 
poverty and social exclusion has been to date little explored. Additionally, it constitutes an interesting case 
study. For, while its economy ranks among the largest in Europe, it is plagued by a long-standing territorial 
dualism, one of the lowest labour market participation among OECD countries and high segmentation of the 
labour force (above all, women, the young and the old). On the other, it features an overly generous, albeit 
largely inefficient, social security system (Ferrera, 2005) and a solid family-based social fabric. In these 
circumstances one would not expect that income poverty and social exclusion are simply “two sides of the 
same coin”. 
Our findings lend support to the view that poverty and social exclusion are rather distinct processes. In 
fact, the degree of dynamic overlap between the two is found to be weaker than generally assumed. This is in 
line with the findings of Whelan et al. (2004) who conclude that income and what they call “life-style 
deprivation” are tapping rather different dimensions of deprivation. The results of our econometric model 
show the existence of sizable ‘true’ state dependence in both poverty and social exclusion, after controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity. Both processes are shaped by a rather persistent dynamics; in fact a second 
order dynamics was found to provide a better fit of the data. Moreover, the dynamics of poverty and social 
exclusion are found to be interrelated, with positive spillover effects that make the two processes mutually 
reinforcing. We argue that social policies aimed at eradicating poverty and avoiding individuals’ social and 
economic marginalization should take these dynamic cross-effects effects explicitly into account. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details of the data used, sample 
selection and the way the poverty and social exclusion indicators are constructed. Section 3 shows 
preliminary empirical evidence on the dynamics of poverty and social exclusion in Italy during the nineties. 
Section 4 illustrates our econometric methodology, whose results are presented in section 5. Section 6 
contains our concluding remarks.  
 
2. Data and indicators 
Data and sample selection  
To study the longitudinal experiences of poverty and social exclusion in Italy, we use the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), 1994-2001, arguably the only household panel survey covering a 
relatively long time period in this country and containing a wealth of information relevant for our aims. The 
ECHP is a multi-country comparative household panel survey conducted annually by following the same 
sample of households and persons in the Member States of the European Union. The advantage of the ECHP 
is that it permits us to analyze economic and social household conditions from a dynamic point of view. 
However, a significant  disadvantage is the omission of the homeless population that would be expected to 
be socially excluded. To minimize sample selection and attrition problems our statistical analysis uses cross-
sectional or the longitudinal weights available in the ECHP, as appropriate. However, as discussed in section 
4, we do not use weights in any of our econometric models, which would otherwise result in a loss of 
efficiency.  
Our analysis focuses on the adult population, excluding both children (individual aged 16 or less) and 
the elderly (aged 60 or more). In the case of children the restriction comes directly from the data:  individuals 
in the ECHP are interviewed only when they reach age 16, making unavailable some of the indicators that 
we use below for the definition of social exclusion. The omission of the elderly rest on a more theoretical 
argument, as we believe that a different definition of social exclusion is likely to be relevant for this age 
group compared to the adult population. For example, the fact that individuals are “not able to work due to 
own illness, injury and incapacitation” – one of the indicator that we use below for identifying the adults at 
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risk of social exclusion (Table 1) – is not an issue if the individuals do not belong to the active population. In 
the rest of the paper, therefore, all the analyses refer to the sample of individuals aged 16-60.1  
 
Indicators of poverty and social exclusion 
An individual is defined as poor if his/her household equivalent income is less than a chosen poverty 
line. The latter is defined as 60% of contemporaneous median income. Note that, even if this may be seen as 
arbitrary, its use has become common practice in Europe and, therefore, it allows comparisons with other 
studies on poverty dynamics. 2 The income variable considered is ‘equivalent household income’, obtained 
after adding up income from all sources from any household member, and then dividing the result by the 
number of equivalent adults (using the OCED-modified equivalence scale). The unit of the analysis is the 
individual. Assuming an equal sharing of an household’s resources, each person within the household is 
attributed the same value of the equivalent household income. These choices are not uncontroversial but are 
made in a large body of the empirical literature studying the dynamics of low-income (for a review, see 
Jenkins, 2000).  
As we said, social exclusion may be defined as a process that fully or partially excludes individuals or 
groups from social, economic and cultural networks in the society they live in (Lee and Murie, 1999). Social 
exclusion can also been seen as a part of Sen’s capability approach, and it can be defined as a process leading 
to a state of functioning deprivations (Sen, 2000). Therefore, the “process” of social exclusion produces a 
“state” of exclusion that can be interpreted as a combination of some relevant deprivations.3 In particular, in 
order to operazionalize the concept, we use the working definition proposed by Poggi (2007a): “An 
individual is defined as socially excluded in a specific point in time if he/she is deprived of two or more 
relevant functionings”. This definition refers to the “state” of social exclusion, and it implies that when one 
deprivation is added to others already in existence the individual is involved in the process called social 
                                                 
1
 We chose the age 60 threshold, rather than 64 as commonly in LFS, in light of the low average age of retirement, at 
about 58 during the nineties, one of the lowest in Europe. Results were only marginally affected by the use of the higher 
threshold.  
2
 We tested the robustness of the thresholds chosen re-performing the analysis using alternative definitions of the cut-off 
points: 40% and 60% of the median distribution. Our main results concerning poverty dynamics, and its relation to 
social exclusion, were essentially unaffected by the alternative cut-off points.   
3
 A number of papers have analyzed poverty from a multidimensional perspective and have identified individual 
deprivation in terms of enforced lack of various durable goods and essential services (e.g., Borooah 2007; D’ambrosio 
et a., 2008; Pérez-Mayo, 2005). Note that deprivation so defined is part of the broader notion of social exclusion we 
focus in this paper. 
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exclusion.4 As a matter of fact, the definition of the relevant dimensions (functionings) is an open issue. 
Following the guidance offered by the recent literature (Brandolini and D’Alessio, 1998; Poggi, 2007a), and 
taking into account the actual information available in the ECHP, we select six relevant dimensions to 
capture all the principal aspects of social exclusion (see Table 1). The selected dimensions are “basic needs 
fulfilment”, “reaching a certain quality of life”, “having an adequate house”, “being healthy and able to 
work”, “living in a safe and clean environment” and “the ability to have social relationships”. The first three 
dimensions describe the economic features of social exclusion, and the remaining dimensions emphasize the 
social dimension of exclusion. In addition, the sixth dimension gives also some information about the 
political dimension of social exclusion. Each of these dimensions represents a functioning considered as 
important in its own right, even if we do not deny that there are interactions between dimensions. Some of 
the items selected from the ECHP to correspond to each dimension are household level variables while 
others are individual level ones (some of them refer to subjective evaluations of the individuals and others –
i.e. health items- are unavoidably biased towards particular groups).  
As in the case of poverty, social exclusion is measured at the individual level; thus, we are aware that 
there could be intra-household correlations in the exclusion/poverty status and we take this into account. For 
each selected item, we assigned to each individual a score ranging from zero to one. A score of one means 
that the individual can afford the item, has the item or does not have ‘the problem’5. Instead, a score equal to 
zero means that the individual is deprived of that item. All the values between zero and one mean an 
intermediate situation. We aggregate the items corresponding to every functioning by summing up their 
scores and dividing the result by the number of items. Equal weights are given to all items.6 Thus, for each 
functioning, an individual receives a score between zero and one. A score of one means that the functioning 
has been fully achieved, a score of zero means that the functioning has not been achieved, and intermediate 
values represent intermediate situations.  
                                                 
4
 But, how many are the deprivations necessary to define an individual as socially excluded? According to Sen (2000) 
we need simultaneous deprivations. The decision about how many deprivations (in our case “at least two”) is arbitrary, 
and partially depends on how many relevant functionings we consider in the analysis. We find that about 8% of the 
sample suffer at least two deprivations simultaneously over the period of analysis and slightly more than 1% is deprived 
in at least 3 dimensions. While in the paper we use deprivation in at least 2 functionings as our threshold we provide 
some robustness analysis in Section 5.        
5
 For example, s/he can afford a durable good or has an indoor flushing toilet or does not have pollution in the area 
where s/he lives. 
6
 See Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998) for more details about the use of equal weights and alternative weighting 
structures. 
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We estimate the correlation between different items belonging to the same dimension, and between 
different dimensions, and we find low degrees of association. Most coefficients are, in absolute value, below 
0.25; the correlation between economic dimensions is just slightly stronger. Except for the correlated “basic 
needs” and “quality of life”, the contemporaneous presence of two deprivations is rare, suggesting that the 
indicators tend to capture complementary aspects. In particularly, social and economic dimensions seem to 
capture different aspects of social exclusion. 
Inclusion or exclusion in each of the six dimensions we selected is clearly a matter of degree. A 
functioning can be achieved at different levels at a point in time, and any choice about the threshold below 
which the individual is counted as deprived has some degree of arbitrariness. In the absence of exogenous 
rules, we fixed the threshold for a functioning at 60% of the median of the functioning distribution.7 This 
choice is the same as for income poverty. Every individual whose functioning score in any given year is 
below the functioning threshold is defined as deprived in that functioning in that year. Therefore, an 
individual can be deprived in one or more functionings. Moreover, we implicitly assume that anyone who is 
able to achieve a valuable functioning would do so. Finally, we combined the information about each 
functioning deprivations in a summary indicator of social exclusion. As in Poggi (2007a), our working 
definition of social exclusion assumes that deprivation in two functionings is sufficient for social exclusion. 
Therefore, an individual is counted as socially excluded at time t if he/she is deprived in at least two 
dimensions. 
 
3. Poverty and social exclusion in Italy: preliminary empirical evidence 
Table 2 shows the proportion of the Italian adult population who experience deprivation in any of the 
selected dimensions, from 1994 to 2001. The incidence of deprivation is particularly high in the following 
dimensions: “living in a safe and clean environment” and “ability to have social relationships”. Therefore, 
the importance of the non-income dimensions immediately emerges. The table also reports the proportion of 
the population who experience social exclusion, poverty, and both, according to our definitions. On average 
over the period 1994-2001, we find that about 8% of the sample is socially excluded and about 20% is poor. 
                                                 
7
 Note that we tested the robustness of the thresholds chosen re-performing the analysis using alternative definitions of 
the cut-points: 40% and 60% of the median distribution and 40%, 50% and 60% of the mean distribution. Comparisons 
of the results suggest that the higher the cut-points, the higher social exclusion. However, the results about the dynamics 
of social exclusion are statistically equivalent for all considered cut-points.   
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Over time, there is a declining trend in both poverty and social exclusion in the sample, which is consistent 
with the general economic growth, the rise in employment rates and steady decline in unemployment rates 
observed throughout the period.  
Interestingly, only 3.5% of the sample is both poor and socially excluded. Of those who are poor in 
any given year, only about 16% are found in social exclusion in the same year (but the percentage is only 6% 
for those who are not poor). Conversely, for those who are socially excluded in a given year, about 41% also 
have their income below the poverty line (compared to only 18% for those who are not socially excluded). 
These findings are in line with those of the previous literature (e.g., Perry, 2002; Whelan et al., 2004) that, 
using a number of statistical and visual inspection techniques, point out the lack of overlap in the proportion 
of individuals defined as poor and deprived / socially excluded at a given point in time, for many different 
countries. Accordingly, we are tempted to conclude against the view that poverty and social exclusion are 
simply alternative ways of measuring the same, underlying, state of deprivation.  
Another way to investigate if poverty and social exclusion are simply alternative ways of measuring 
the same underlying concept is by using a non-linear Wald proportionality test on the coefficients of two 
probit models, one for poverty, the other for social exclusion. Put simply, the idea is that, if poverty and 
social exclusion are two different proxies of a common latent variable, then one might expect that the 
coefficients of the poverty model are simply a scaled version of the coefficients of the social exclusion 
model. In other words, if poorkβ represent the coefficients of covariate k in the poverty model, and sekβ  the 
corresponding coefficient in the social exclusion model, the null hypothesis of coefficient proportionality is 
stated as:  
    
se
K
poor
K
se
k
poor
k
se
poor
H β
β
β
β
β
β
==== ......     :
1
1
0  
where the same K covariates are used in both equations. The test is carried out as a non linear Wald test. We 
run the two (static) probit models using various specifications including a broad set of controls (sex, age, 
education, cohabitation status, number of household dependent members, number of household working 
members, area of residence and year dummies). In all cases we were able to reject the null hypothesis at the 
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1% level of statistical significance8, which strengthen our confidence against the “two sides of the same 
coin” hypothesis and in favour of the view that poverty and social exclusion are better interpreted as distinct, 
albeit related, processes.  
All previous results refer to the cross-sectional incidence of poverty and social exclusion. To assess 
an individual’s longitudinal experience of deprivation and, in particular, how the current state is related to 
past occurrences of poverty and social exclusion we now turn to the panel dimension of the data. Table 3 
reports the proportion of the sample that experiences social exclusion / poverty for a certain number of years. 
As typically found in the literature, the fraction of the sample who is in deprivation in at least one year within 
the time period under investigation is much higher than the cross-sectional deprivation rate. In fact, about 
48% is touched by income poverty in at lest one year, and 33% in the case of social exclusion (against a 
cross-sectional rate of 20% and 8%, respectively). Less than 1% of the sample experience social exclusion 
over the entire period of study, but about 4% of the sample is persistently poor in all eight waves. In other 
words, the deprivation states are characterized by a fair amount of turnover, so that it is not always the same 
individuals who are found below the deprivation thresholds. Devicienti and Gualtieri, 2006, provide 
compelling evidence of this phenomenon with respect of various definitions of poverty.  
Nonetheless, people who have already suffered some form of deprivation in the past appear to be 
more likely of suffering further deprivation in the future. As shown in Table 4, the conditional probability of 
being poor in year t given that the individual was not poor in t-1 is 8%, but it dramatically increases to 65% 
for those who were poor in t-1. Similarly, the probability of being socially excluded in t is 3.5% for those 
who were not excluded in t-1, but is 42% for those who were already classified as socially excluded. The 
table also shows that lagged poverty (social exclusion) is positively associated to social exclusion (poverty) 
in the current year, hinting at the possibility that dynamic spillover effects exist between the two processes.  
In fact, the probability of being currently poor is 3% among those who were not socially excluded in the 
previous year, and rises at 45% for those who were. Similarly, the probability of being  socially excluded in t 
is equal to 4% for those whose income in t-1 was above the poverty line, and 14% for those classified as 
income poor in t-1. How can we explain the correlation that we observe in the data between an individual’s 
                                                 
8
 Note that the non-linear Wald test is not invariant with respect to representation. In fact, an alternative representation 
of the null hypothesis is as follow: KKkkH 2121
1
2
1
10 ......: ββββββ ==== . If both representations lead to similar 
test statistics and p-values, one is able to accept or reject the hypothesis of proportionality of the coefficient of the two 
equations. The results of the tests are available upon request from the authors. 
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current and past poverty and current and past social exclusion? And how can we explain the cross-correlation 
found between current and past occurrences of the two forms of deprivation for the same individual? Clearly, 
these correlations may simply reflect the effect of individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Alternatively, an individual’s past experience in one form of deprivation may have a causal effect on current 
deprivation of the same type, or also of the other type. Our understanding of the causes leading to 
deprivation persistence at the individual level is likely to be enhanced if we were able to disentangle between 
these alternative explanations. This is the aim of the econometric model introduced in the next section.    
 
4. An econometric model for the interrelated dynamics of poverty and social exclusion  
To study the interrelated dynamics of poverty and social exclusion, in this section we introduce a 
dynamic random-effect bivariate probit model for the joint probability of experiencing the two states. The 
model allows for correlated unobserved heterogeneity and accounts for the initial conditions of the two 
processes. The presentation of the model follows that of Alessie et al. (2004) for the most part9; however, our 
treatment of the initial conditions is different and, we argue, more convenient for our purposes, as will be 
explained below.  
For an individual i, the risk of being in poverty at time t is expressed in terms of a latent variable *1ity , 
as specified as in equation (1), while the risk of being socially excluded in t is expressed by the latent 
variable *2ity , specified in equation (2).  
 
itititiitit ucyyxy 11121,2111,11
'*
1 ++++= −− γγβ         (1) 
itititiitit ucyyxy 22221,2211,12
'*
2 ++++= −− γγβ         (2) 
[ ]01 * >= jitjit yy ,  j = 1,2;       t = 2, . . . , T        (3) 
 
The dependent variables are the dummy indicators ity1 (equal to one if the individual is at risk of 
poverty in t, and zero otherwise) and ity2  (equal to one if i is at risk of social exclusion in t, and zero 
                                                 
9
 See Heitmueller and Michaud (2006) and Miranda (2007) for applications of the model of Alessie et al. (2004) in 
different contexts.  
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otherwise).  In the model represented by (1)-(3), itx  is a vector of independent variables, assumed to be 
strictly exogenous, and β =( 1β , 2β ) is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The errors 
terms itu1  and itu2  are assumed to be independent over time and to follow a bivariate normal distribution, 
with zero means, unit variances and cross-equation covariance ρ . The model also includes individual 
random effects, ic1  and ic2 , assumed to be bivariate normal with variances 
2
1cσ  and 
2
2cσ  and covariance 
1cσ 2cσ cρ . We also assume that ( ic1 , ic2 ), ( itu1 , itu2 ; t=1,…,T) and ( itx ; t=1,…,T) are independent 
(implying that itx  is strictly exogenous).  
This dynamic random-effects model is well suited to tackle the issue of “true state dependence”, that is 
to say to establish the causal impact of past poverty on current poverty and of past social exclusion on 
current social exclusion, once the confounding impact due to unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. As 
is well known, both phenomena (unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence) can explain why, say, 
being poor in t-1 is correlated with being poor in t; however, the policy implications are different in the two 
cases. For example, if the persistence of poverty (social exclusion) is, at least partly, due to true state 
dependence, then it is possible to reduce the risk of experiencing poverty (social exclusion) in the future by 
pulling the individual out of poverty (social exclusion) at time t. Thus, short-term policies may have long-
lasting effects because they help breaking the “vicious circle” leading to deprivation. On the contrary, if the 
persistence of poverty (social exclusion) is merely due to adverse unobserved heterogeneity, any such policy 
intervention is bound to be ineffective in the long run and can have, at best, only temporary effects. To 
disentangle between unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence, the lagged dependent variable, 
1,1 −tiy , is included in the poverty equation (1) and the lagged dependent variable 1,2 −tiy  is included in the 
social exclusion equation (2). The dynamics of the model is here assumed to be first-order for simplicity; 
however, later in the paper, we will also allow for second order dynamics.  
Reflecting our interest in uncovering the presence of dynamic spillover effects from poverty to social 
exclusion, and from social exclusion to poverty, the model also includes cross-effect lagged variables: lagged 
social exclusion 1,2 −tiy  is included in the poverty equation and lagged poverty 1,1 −tiy  is included in the social 
exclusion equation. This way it may be possible to understand whether the correlation observed in the data 
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between, say, y1,t-1 and y2t is due to correlated unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., ρc≠0) or rather to state 
dependence across poverty and social exclusion (i.e., the spillover effects 12γ  and 21γ  are non-zero). The 
distinction is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the two forms of deprivation and for the design of 
policy. For example, if true spillover effects exist, and are positive, policies aimed at pulling individuals out 
of one type of deprivation may also contribute in breaking the cycle leading to deprivation of the other type.  
The model in (1)-(3) embeds a few simpler models as special cases. If 02112 == γγ , equations (1) 
and (2) can be estimated separately, obtaining consistent estimates of the remaining parameters. This special 
case corresponds to the standard univariate random-effect dynamic probit model (see Heckman, 1981a; 
Stewart, 2005, provides further discussion). If 012 ≠γ , but the error terms and the random effects of the two 
equations are independent (respectively, 0=ρ  and 0=cρ ), then equation (1) can be estimated as a 
univariate model treating 1,1 −tiy  as weakly exogenous. A similar reasoning applies to equation (2) in the 
independence case. In all other cases, consistent estimates of the parameters require the joint estimation of 
model (1)-(3). 
 
Estimating the model: the Alessie et. al (2004) estimator 
In dynamic panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity, the treatment of the initial observations 
is an important theoretical and practical problem, particularly so in short panels. The simplest approach 
assumes that the pre-sample history, or initial conditions, are exogenous and can be ignored (e.g. Heckman, 
1981a). This restriction is valid only if the process begins at the start of the observed sample period, or if the 
disturbances that generate the process are serially independent, which is not the case in the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, if heterogeneity is a determining factor in the initial sample conditions, 
then this approach will overstate the amount of state dependence in the process. 
For the initial period t=1, model (1)-(3) would require the observation of 01iy  and 02iy ; however, data 
at times 0, -1, -2, … are not available. In the univariate case, Heckman (1981b) suggests to replace the 
equation for t=1 by a static equation with different regression coefficients and arbitrary combinations of the 
random effects. This can be seen as a linearized approximation to the reduced form for the latent variable in 
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the initial period. Alessie et al. (2004) propose to generalize Heckman’s approach to the bivariate model 
represented by (1)-(3) and introduce two static equations for t=1, as follows: 
112121111
'
1
*
11 iiiii ccxy ελλκ +++=         (4) 
122221212
'
1
*
12 iiiii ccxy ελλκ +++=         (5) 
where the error terms 11iε  and 21iε  are standard normal with correlation coefficient ερ .10  
Estimation of the model composed by equations (1)-(5) can be carried out by maximum likelihood 
methods. The likelihood contribution of an individual observed in T waves (t=1,…, T) is of the form: 
212121
1
),,(),( dcdcccgcchL cii
N
i
A Σ= ∫ ∫Π
+∞
∞−
+∞
∞−
=
       (6) 
where g is the joint density of ),( 21 cc , with covariance matrix Σc, and ih  is the joint probability of the 
observed binary sequence for individual i : 
( )
( )∏
=
−−
Φ×
×Φ=
T
t
itttitititititit
iteiiiiiii
xyyyyyy
xyyyycch
2
1,21,12122112
121112121111221
...,,|~~,~,~
 | ~~,~,~),(
ρµµ
ρµµ
    (7) 
( )ρ,,2 ⋅⋅Φ  is the bivariate cumulative density function of a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, 
unit variances and covariance ρ , and 12~ −= jitjit yy , for j=1,2. For t=1, 11iµ  and 12iµ  are defined as: 
   
iiii
iiii
ccx
ccx
2221212
'
112
2121111
'
111
λλκµ
λλκµ
++=
++=
       (8) 
and for t=2,…, T, it1µ  and it2µ  are defined as: 
  
ititiitit
ititiitit
cyyx
cyyx
2221,2211,12
'
2
1121,2111,11
'
1
+++=
+++=
−−
−−
γγβµ
γγβµ
.     (9) 
The likelihood contribution in (6) is the expected value of the likelihood contribution 
conditional on the random effects ),( 21 cc . As discussed in details by Alessie et al. (2004), standard 
approaches of numerically integrating out the random effects are feasible but difficult in the present 
                                                 
10
 Heckman recommends the inclusion of exogenous s instruments in the initial condition equations, whenever 
available. This is done in a few studies, for example Stewart (2005) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) use information 
on the respondent’s parental background when the respondent was 14 as exogenous instruments. However, this pre-
sample information is not available in the ECHP. Note that Alessie et al. (2004) too do not include exogenous 
instruments in their initial condition equations.       
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setting. Instead, they proceed by approximating the expectation in (6) by simulation methods.11 We 
do the same, using a BFGS algorithm to maximize the likelihood function.12  
 
An alternative Wooldridge-type estimator 
The approach followed by Alessie et. al. (2004) provides a flexible characterization of the sample 
initial conditions in terms of the observable covariates and unobserved individual effects, and represents a 
straightforward generalization of the univariate Heckman estimator. In this paper, we will follow a different 
route for the treatment of the initial conditions, extending to the bivariate case the simple approach proposed 
by Wooldridge (2005) for univariate dynamic random effects probit models. We do so for two main reasons: 
(i) our treatment extends more readily to a model with higher order dynamics, which is found to be crucial in 
our empirical application; (ii) our treatment is simpler, resulting in substantial savings in computer time. This 
second issue may not be very important in samples of moderate size, but becomes very much relevant in 
cases, like our own, where there are almost 40,000 observations.  
Rather than attempting to obtain the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous variables, as 
in the previous estimator, Wooldridge (2005) proposes a Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator 
that considers the distribution conditional on the initial values and the observed history of strictly exogenous 
explanatory variables. In other words, instead of modelling the density of ( iTi yy ,...,1 ) given ix , Wooldridge 
suggests modelling the density of ( iTi yy ,...,2 ) conditional on ( 1iy , ix ). The estimator can be viewed as 
simply using a different approximation which has computational advantages. While Heckman specifies a 
model for 1iy  given ix  and ic , Wooldridge specifies one for ic  given 1iy  and ix . For the univariate case, 
he assumes:  
 iiii axyaac α+++= 2
'
110        (10) 
where a0, a1, and a2  are parameters to be estimated, ix  contains longitudinal averages of itx ,
13
 and iα  has 
zero mean normal distribution and variance 2ασ . Substituting (10) into a univariate dynamic probit model 
                                                 
11
 For our simulated maximum likelihood estimation we used 2RN Halton draws (see Train, 2003), where N is the 
number of individuals and we set the number of replications, R, equal to 60.   
12
 The Alessie et al. model required approximately twice the computing time of the Wooldridge-type estimator. The 
programs to implement the models are available from the authors upon request.  
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with random effects (say, equation (1) above, with 12γ =0 and 0== aρρ ), gives Wooldridge’s final 
equation, which can be estimated with a standard random effects probit software (see, Stewart, 2005, for 
further discussion).  
To generalize this approach in the context of our bivariate probit model, we specify the individual 
specific effects 1ic and 2ic  given the poverty initial condition, 11iy , the social exclusion initial condition, 
12iy , and the time-constant explanatory variables ix , as follows:  
    iiiii axyayaac 113
'
12121111101 α++++=    (11) 
iiiii axyayaac 223
'
12221121202 α++++=    (12) 
where j0a , j1a , j2a  and j3a  (j=1,2) are parameters to be estimated, ( i1α , i2α ) are normally distributed with 
covariance matrix αΣ : 








=Σ 2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
. α
αααα
α
σ
ρσσσ
.     (13) 
Then after inserting in model (1)-(2) we obtain: 
 
itiiiititiitit
itiiiititiitit
uaxyayaayyxy
uaxyayaayyxy
2223
'
1222112120221,2211,12
'*
2
1113
'
1212111110121,2111,11
'*
1
++++++++=
++++++++=
−−
−−
αγγβ
αγγβ
   (14) 
 
Consistent estimates of the model’s parameters can be obtained by Conditional Maximum Simulated 
Likelihood methods. The contribution of individual i to the likelihood may be written as follow:  
 
( ) ( )∫ ∫∏
+∞
∞−
+∞
∞− =
−−
ΣΦ=
T
t
iiiitttitititititit
W ddgxxyyyyyyL
1
21211,21,12122112 ,,,...,|~~,~,~ ααααρµµ α   (15) 
 
where it1µ and it2µ  are the right-hand sides of equations in (14) excluding the error terms itu1  and itu2 .  
A first advantage of our Wooldridge-type estimator over the Alessie et al. (2004) estimators is 
immediately clear. In fact, it can be easily shown that the number of parameters to be estimated is always 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13
 Note that time-constant variables (e.g., gender) may be included in either (10) or in (1)-(2). It is not possible to 
separately identify the effect of time-constant variables  on unobserved heterogeneity and on the latent variables.  
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smaller in the first estimator than in the second (and the gap grows in models where most exogenous 
variables are time-invariant). When savings in computing time is an issue, as it is in large samples like our 
own, it becomes important for applied researchers to be able to resort to simpler estimation approaches.  
A second advantage of our estimator is that it can be easily used for estimating models with a higher 
order dynamics. In section 5, in fact, we will specify our model with second order dynamics but will still be 
able to use our estimator. As we have specified a model for ( i1α , i2α ) given the initial observations of the 
dependent variables (and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables), it is always 
possible to simply add 2, −tjiy  (j=1,2) in (14) and use the same estimator as developed above. In the Alessie 
et al. (2004) estimator, on the other hand, one would have to include additional static equations for the initial 
condition at time t=2, thereby considerably increasing the demands on the econometric model.    
A final comment is in order concerning the requirement that models incorporating the initial condition 
solution proposed by Wooldridge (2005) be estimated on a balanced panel. Accordingly one may be worried 
that the estimator could potentially exacerbate attrition and sample selection present in the data. In fact, this 
is not the case, since Wooldridge’s method has some advantages in facing selection and attrition problems. 
In particular, as explained in Wooldridge (2005; pp.44), it allows selection and attrition to depend on the 
initial conditions and, therefore, it allows attrition to differ across initial levels of deprivation. In particular, 
individuals with different initial statuses are allowed to have different missing data probabilities. Thus, we 
consider selection and attrition without explicitly modelling them as a function of the initial conditions. As a 
result, the analysis is less complicated and it compensates for the potential loss of information from using a 
balanced panel. Moreover, in the conditional MLE we can ignore any stratification that is a function of the 
initial level of deprivation and of the time-constant explanatory variables: thus, using sampling weights 
would lead to an efficiency loss. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of the dynamic models for poverty and social exclusion 
discussed in the previous section. We start with simple univariate models, i.e. we estimate dynamic random-
effects probit models separately for poverty and social exclusion. These represent special cases of the 
bivariate model presented in section 4: we can therefore test the restrictions imposed by the univariate 
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models. We then compare the estimates obtained with the two different treatments of the initial conditions in 
the dynamic bivariate model. Next, we test the assumption that the dynamics are first order against the 
second order alternative. Finally, we discuss in details our preferred specification and show the implications 
of the model’s estimates in terms of true state dependence and dynamic spillover effects.  
Some of the explanatory variables included in the vector xit refer to individual-level characteristics 
(see Table 5 for descriptive statistics): gender, age (linear), dummies for low and medium education (high 
education is the reference category), marital status (=1 if living as a couple). Household-level characteristics 
are also included in xit: the number of economically active members of the household, and the number of 
dependent household members (children and non-active adults). These variables are allowed to be time 
varying. An unrestricted set of year dummies is also included in all specifications to capture the 
macroeconomic environment. Structural differences in local conditions (e.g., labour markets tightness, 
differences in regional prices) are summarized by a set of regional dummies, included in all specifications. In 
both equations, the same explanatory variables are used. While in principle a wider set of influences may be 
considered, we have maintained our reduced-form specifications relatively parsimonious because (i) we are 
already controlling for (correlated) unobserved heterogeneity, (ii) the estimation of our model is already 
computationally demanding. More importantly, the variables included in xit  do not constitute the main focus 
of the analysis: this lies instead in the interrelated dynamics of poverty and social exclusion, which is 
reflected in the estimates of the lagged indicators for both dependent variables. Indeed, as we show below 
with reference to the potentially endogenous variables of xit, the inclusion/exclusion of observed 
heterogeneity controls does not significantly alter the main parameters of interest.  
 
Univariate random-effects dynamics models for poverty and social exclusion 
We start by estimating the poverty and the social exclusion equations separately. In this case we are 
implicitly assuming that (i) the cross-lagged variables effects are equal to zero; and/or (ii) the correlation of 
the errors and the correlation of random effects across the two equations are equal to zero. We estimate the 
two equations with both the Heckman and the Wooldridge estimators using the same specification: results 
are reported in Table 6 for the poverty equation and in Table 7 for the social exclusion equation. The 
corresponding pooled probit models (without random effects and no initial condition) are also reported in the 
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Tables for comparison. Note that the initial conditions a la Wooldridge imply that the start-of-period status 
of poverty and social exclusion be included in the model. As shown by (11) and (12), longitudinally-
averaged versions of the time-varying variables contained in xit are also included in these models. The 
estimates of the variables referring to the initial conditions in each estimator are reported in Table 9. 
As noted in section 4, the Wooldridge estimator requires a balanced panel sample. For comparison, 
the same balanced sample is used for all other estimators in the paper. We have already pointed out that this 
restriction is not particularly problematic with the Wooldridge-type estimators. To provide further evidence 
on the issue, we compared the estimates of pooled univariate probit models of poverty and social exclusion 
with and without the balanced sample restriction. We repeated the same comparison with pooled bivariate 
models of the two equations. In each case, we found that the restriction to a balanced sample had only a 
negligible impact on the coefficients of the own-lags and cross-lags of the dependent variables.14  
According to the results of Table 6, the Heckman and the Wooldridge estimators deliver very similar 
estimates of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, equal to 0.74 and 0.78, respectively. Both are 
also highly statistically significant. As remarked by Wooldridge (2005), the similarity between the two 
estimators is to be expected. On the other hand, the same coefficient is overestimated in the pooled probit 
models: the scaled15 coefficient of lagged poverty is estimated at 0.55 with the Heckman estimator and at 
0.64 with the Wooldridge’s, compared with the pooled probit estimate of 1.5. This should not be surprising, 
as the pooled probit model does not control for the process’ initial conditions, nor does it allow for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the social exclusion equation in Table 7: the 
scaled coefficients estimated on lagged social exclusion is 0.40 for the Heckman estimator and 0.57 for the 
Wooldridge’s, compared with an estimate of 1.4 for the pooled probit.  
The results of Table 6 and 7 also show that there are positive and statistically significant dynamic 
spillover effects among the two equations. The coefficient of lagged social exclusion is estimated at 0.28 in 
the poverty equation if the Heckman estimator is used; the estimate obtained with the Wooldridge estimator 
is not too different, at 0.22. In the social exclusion equation, lagged poverty has a statistically significant 
                                                 
14
 The estimates of these and further robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.  
15
 Note that the dynamic random effects probit models and the pooled probit model involve different normalizations 
(see Arulampalam, 1999) and, therefore, the estimated coefficients of the former need to be rescaled to be compared 
with the estimated coefficients of the latter. In our case the coefficients of the random effects models need to be 
multiplied by an estimate of ( ) 2/121 −− ασ . 
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coefficient of 0.29 with the Heckman estimator and 0.21 with Wooldridge’s. One immediate consequence of 
the non-zero coefficients of the cross-lagged variables is that the two equations can be estimated separately, 
as done here, only if the error correlation and the random effects correlation are equal to zero ( 0== aρρ ). 
To test the latter hypothesis, we now estimate the dynamic bivariate probit model with random effects of 
section 4.  
 
Bivariate dynamic random-effects models for poverty and social exclusion 
Table 8 reports the estimates of the dynamic bivariate probit model for poverty and social exclusion, 
which relaxes the assumption of independence in the errors and the random effects of the two equations. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the Alessie et al (2004) estimator, 
with initial conditions a la Heckman, as described by our equations (1)-(5). Columns 3 and 4 report instead 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the dynamic bivariate probit model with random effects and 
initial condition a la Wooldridge, as summarized by equation (14). For comparison, columns 1 and 2 report 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors of a pooled dynamic bivariate probit model.  
We first note that in both the Alessie et al. (2004) model and our Wooldridge-type estimator we are 
able to reject the hypothesis of independence in the errors and the random effects of the two equations, 
indicating that the joint estimation of the model equations is necessary. In fact, ρ  is statistically significant 
and equal to 0.05 in both estimators. As for the random effects correlation, αρ , this too is statistically 
significant, with an estimated coefficient of 0.27 in the first estimator and 0.32 in the second.  
The estimates of the pooled bivariate probit model do not control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity and assumes that the initial conditions are exogenous. One would then expect that this 
estimator overestimate the importance of state dependence, as the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable absorbs part of the effect that is instead due to (uncontrolled) unobserved heterogeneity. A quick 
glance at Table 8 confirms that this is indeed the case. We also note that the estimates of the lagged 
dependent variables and of the cross-lagged dependent variables are slightly lower in the bivariate random–
effect models than in the corresponding univariate models. Thus, ignoring the cross-correlations in the error 
terms seems to slightly overestimate such parameters.   
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The results in Table 8 from both the dynamic random effects probit model estimators (i.e. our 
Wooldridge-type estimator and the Alessie et. al. estimator) show a strong degree of agreement, as already 
found with the univariate models. Given the advantages of the Wooldridge estimator pointed out in section 4, 
this is the estimator that we use in the rest of the paper. Two other specifications are considered in Table 10. 
First, we exclude the potentially endogenous variables in xit and check that the estimates of the key variables 
of interest, the lagged dependent variables, were not overly affected by their inclusion (Specification 2). 
Second, we estimate a model with second order dynamics (Specification 3).  
As a simple robustness check, Specification 2 excludes three time-varying variables that may be 
regarded as potentially endogenous (Biewen, 2007): the number of working members in the household, 
marital status and the number of dependent household members. The dynamics is assumed to be first-order. 
The results are compared with the ones obtained by Specification 1a, also reported in Table 10 for 
convenience. Both specifications point out that there is considerable unobserved heterogeneity that cannot be 
explained by the covariates: the standard deviations of the random effects are statistically significant and are 
estimated at 0.8 and 0.9 for poverty and social exclusion, respectively. In both specifications, we also 
observe true state dependence and positive cross-effects of lagged deprivation: in particular, the coefficients 
of  lagged values of poverty and social exclusion are 0.1 and 0.7 in the poverty equation, and 0.6 and 0.09 in 
the social exclusion equation. Both specifications also highlight a statistically significant positive correlation 
between initial conditions (p(1) and se(1)) and the unobserved heterogeneity. Since the implication of the 
two specifications are very similar, we may conclude that the estimates of the key parameters are not 
affected by the excluded time-varying variables. Therefore, the richer specification 1a is preferred to 
specification 2.16   
 
Second order dynamics 
Specification 3 assumes that the dynamics is second-order. The idea is to test the sensitivity of the 
assumption of first-order dynamics imposed to the previous models: we do this by comparing specifications 
1a and specification 3. Indeed, the raw conditional probabilities reported at the bottom of Table 4 show that 
an individual’s current deprivation is related not only to the deprivation s/he experienced in the previous year 
                                                 
16
 More generally, our econometric experimentation showed that estimates of true state dependence and the dynamic 
spillover effects are very much robust to the inclusion/exclusion of other controls in xit. 
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(lag 1) but also to the deprivation status experienced two years earlier (lag 2). To what extent is this high 
persistency in the status of poverty and social exclusion due to unobserved heterogeneity (uncontrolled for in 
Table 4) or is rather signalling that a first-order assumption is not an adequate representation of the dynamics 
of the processes under scrutiny? To investigate this issue we therefore augment our core random-effect 
bivariate model with initial conditions a la Wooldridge to include lag 2 of both poverty and social exclusion 
(Specification 3). As it happens, it turns out that the second order dynamics terms are all positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, the first-order Markov assumption is unwarranted and specification 3 is our 
preferred one. We therefore discuss the results of this specification more in depth. 
For poverty, the lag-2 coefficient is estimated at 0.55, approximately half the size of the lag-1 
coefficient, which is now estimated at 1.03 (higher than the 0.71 estimate reported in specification 1a). Also, 
the lag-2 cross effect is sizeable, estimated at 0.15 in the poverty equation. For social exclusion, own lag-2 
estimate is even higher, at 0.71, and the lag-2 cross-effect is estimated at 0.12. 
The standard deviations of the random effects are statistically significant and are estimated at 0.38 
and 0.34 for poverty and social exclusion, respectively. Note that these standard deviations are less than half 
the size of the estimates obtained assuming first order dynamics. Unobserved heterogeneity then still plays a 
role in explaining the observed persistence in poverty and social exclusion, but it accounts for only a third of 
the unsystematic variation in the model. Much of the two processes’ observed persistence, therefore, seems 
to be related to a ‘true scarring impact’, which (i) makes individuals experiencing poverty or social exclusion 
more likely to experience them again in the future, (ii) has ‘long memory, in the sense that the risks are 
worse for those individuals who have spent more than one year in the state, and (iii) is cross-reinforcing as 
past (lag 1 and 2) experience of one type of deprivation significantly increases the chances of future 
deprivation of the other type.  
Once the dynamics of the model is allowed to be second order, the correlation between the two 
random terms is negative but imprecisely estimated, resulting in a statistically insignificant coefficient. 
Therefore, we do not have sufficient evidence to suggest that people whose persistent unobserved personal, 
household and community characteristics make them more vulnerable to poverty tend to be the same people 
whose unobserved characteristics make them more vulnerable to social exclusion, compared to the rest of the 
population.  
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It may be noted that the correlation of the (contemporaneous) error terms in the two equations is 
statistically significant, with a point estimate of 0.11. A positive correlation suggests that the myriad of 
idiosyncratic shocks that, at any given time period, drive people into poverty and into social exclusion have 
common elements. This finding implies that the raw correlation found in the data between being in poverty 
and in social exclusion at any given time is also due to the correlation in the processes’ idiosyncratic shocks. 
Therefore, even after allowing for a rich dynamics and unobserved heterogeneity, the two processes are 
simultaneously determined, and are more efficiently estimated jointly.    
Finally, we briefly discuss the estimates of the controls included in the vector xit . According to the 
results in specification 3, individuals with low education have a higher risk of being in poverty than those 
with medium education, and even more so than those with high education. The same is true with respect to 
social exclusion. Age, entered linearly for simplicity, has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
income poverty, reflecting the increased command on economic resources as the individual ages. However, 
the same coefficient is not statistically different from zero in the case of social exclusion. We are unable to 
detect clear differences on the deprivation risks faced by males and females: the dummy for female is 
generally found to be statistically insignificant in our models. The number of economically active members 
in the household decreases the probability of being in poverty and the probabilities of being socially 
excluded. Conversely, the risk of poverty increases with the number of children and other dependent adults 
in the  household; however, the effect is not statistically different from zero in the case of social exclusion. 
Persons living as a couple (married or unmarried) are less likely to be socially excluded, while there is no 
statistical significant effect in the case of poverty. Reflecting the country’s long-standing territorial dualism 
and the marked differences in the regional unemployment rates, southern regions consistently display higher 
risks of income poverty than both northern and central regions. However, regional disparities in income 
poverty do not always translate in similar disparities in social exclusion, as can be seen by comparing the two 
sets of regional dummies.  
More in general, our reading of the results concerning the observed heterogeneity is that, while the 
effect of many of the controls included in the model goes in the expected direction, poverty and social 
exclusion are not always explained by the same set of factors, reinforcing the view expressed above that the 
two processes are genuinely distinct, albeit dynamically interrelated.  
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Robustness checks 
How robust are our findings about the dynamic interrelationship between income poverty and social 
exclusion? A major concern is clearly that they are too dependent on our empirical choices regarding the 
definition of social exclusion. In this case a number of robustness checks are therefore in order. To start with, 
we checked whether the dynamic interrelationship between income poverty and social exclusion was driven 
by the particular cut-off point chosen to identify who is socially excluded in any given year (deprivation in at 
least two functionings). Therefore we have re-estimated our models using (i) deprivation in at least one 
functioning and (ii) deprivation in at least three functions as alternative cut-off points. The estimates are 
shown in Table 11 (Model 1 and 2, respectively). The coefficients of own lags and cross-lags were found to 
be positive and statistically significant for both income poverty and social exclusions, allowing us to 
conclude that the dynamic relationship between the two forms of disadvantage is not driven by the cut-off 
point choices. Our second check is related to the dimensions included in the definition of social exclusion, as 
indicated by Table 1. To what extent are the results driven by the inclusion/exclusion of some of these 
components? Our experimentation revealed that in general the omission of one or another of the dimensions 
listed in the table is mostly inconsequential for the existence of dynamics spillover effects between income 
poverty and social exclusion (for example, see Table 11: Models 3 and 4). In fact, we found that the two 
forms of deprivation are dynamically interrelated even for the most extreme version of “social exclusion” 
that excludes the three dimensions mostly related to income (namely, “basic needs fulfilment”, “to reach a 
certain quality of life”, and “having an adequate house”): own lags were positive and statistically significant; 
cross-lags too were positive, albeit only weakly significant (at the 10% level).  
Overall, while we see the definition of social exclusion that we have used in this paper as a 
reasonable compromise between the theoretical underpinnings of the concept and the data practically 
available for its implementation, the results of these robustness checks increased our confidence in the 
validity of the main messages of the paper. At the same time, it is perhaps fair to conclude by saying that, 
until a more widely accepted way of measuring social exclusion becomes available in the empirical 
literature, our results should be taken as suggestive only of the existence of significant spillover effects 
between income poverty and social exclusion. With this caveat in mind we move on to show the model’s 
predicted probabilities.  
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Predicted probabilities 
For both equations, the lagged dependent variables concerning poverty and social exclusion are 
significantly positive. To evaluate the relevance of the dynamics in the model, we estimate the predicted 
probabilities of being in poverty, and for being in social exclusion, for various lagged statuses of deprivation 
(Table 12). As suggested by Wooldridge (2005), predicted probabilities are first computed at individual 
characteristics, keeping lagged dependent variables at specified values, and then averaged in the sample. The 
estimated parameters corresponding to each variable in Xit=(xit, y1i,t-1, y2i,t-1, y1jit-2, y2jit-2) are multiplied by 
( ) 2/12ˆ1 −+ jσ , for j=1,2, so as take into account the estimated distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, and 
the corresponding linear predictions are inserted into the cumulative standard normal distribution function, 
separately for each equation.  
According to our preferred specification, the probability of being poor in t is about 0.12 for those 
who were neither poor nor socially excluded in t-1. However, the same probability is almost three times 
larger, at 0.35, if the individual was poor the year before, albeit not socially excluded. For those both poor 
and socially excluded in t-1, the chances of being poor in t raise further, at about 0.44. Similarly, the 
probability of being socially exclude in t is about 0.03 for those who were neither poor nor socially excluded 
in t-1. This probability is about five times higher, at 0.17, if the individual was socially excluded the year 
before, albeit not poor. For those both poor and socially excluded in t-1, the chances of being excluded in t 
increase further, at about 0.23. The results discussed so far are in line with the findings of the previous 
literature reporting positive state dependence in social exclusion (e.g., Poggi, 2007a) and income poverty 
(e.g., Cappellari and Jenkins, 2004). However, while those studies focus on the dynamics of a single process 
separately, either poverty or social exclusion, and assume first-order dynamics, our random-effect dynamic 
bivariate model also gives insights into the relation between the two types of deprivation and tests the 
appropriateness of the first-order assumption. In fact, we observe that the probability of being poor and the 
probability of being socially excluded in t are respectively about 0.092 and 0.024 for those were neither poor 
nor socially excluded in the two previous years (Table 13). These probabilities are instead much larger for 
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those who were both poor and socially excluded in the two years before, and are equal, respectively, to 0.633 
and 0.486, providing further evidence of the empirical relevance of the second order dynamics.17  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the dynamics of poverty and social exclusion at the individual level, using the 
Italian sample of the European Community Household Panel, waves 1-8. On theoretical grounds, social 
exclusion is presented as a process with distinctive features than income poverty, albeit it is recognised that 
the two dimensions of deprivation share common traits and should be characterized by interrelated dynamics. 
Indeed, the empirical literature exploring the way the two processes interact over an individual’s life course 
is scant, but generally provides indications that, at the individual level, they overlap less than commonly 
held. The statistical evidence presented in this paper has indeed provided elements that confirm this view: 
poverty and social exclusion do not simply constitute alternative ways of representing the same underlying 
concept of deprivation. Instead, the low correlation they display over time for the same individual is against a 
“two sides of the same coin” conjecture.  
To further explore their dynamic interrelation, the paper has used a dynamic bivariate probit model with 
random effects, that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. For the latter, we show how 
the approach of Wooldridge (2005) can be easily extended to our bivariate dynamic model, resulting in an 
estimator that more readily accommodates second order dynamics and is computationally more convenient 
than the one originally proposed by Alessie et al. (2004).  
We find a sizable extent of ‘true’ state dependence in both poverty and social exclusion, that is to 
say, past deprivation raises the chances of future deprivation once (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity 
is controlled for. Moreover, there are dynamic spillover effects, implying that poverty and social exclusion 
are mutually reinforcing. The results also suggest that the two processes are shaped by a rather persistent 
dynamics, and that a first-order Markov assumption, often used in empirical works on deprivation dynamics, 
is unwarranted. Instead, both second-lag of poverty and social exclusion significantly affect the chances of 
future deprivation of both types. Unobserved heterogeneity is also found to be empirically relevant, 
                                                 
17
 Note that experiencing poverty and/or social exclusion in the past, even if not the year before, is nonetheless harmful: 
in Table 12 the probability of being poor (socially excluded) in t is about 0.2 (0.1) for those who experienced either 
poverty and social exclusion in t-2 but not in t-1. 
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accounting for at least a third of the unsystematic variation in the model and making necessary the use of 
estimators that explicitly control for it. Moreover, poverty and social exclusion feature contemporaneous 
correlation, implying that the two processes are best estimated jointly.  
Our results suggest that social policies aimed at eradicating poverty and avoiding individuals’ social 
marginalization should take these dynamic interaction effects explicitly into account. Clearly, reliance on a 
single set of measures, for example those aimed at raising households’ incomes above a chosen cut off, are 
unlikely to be successful in preventing material deprivation and outright social exclusion. Properly devised 
measures call instead for differentiated interventions for various groups of vulnerable individuals, carefully 
distinguishing between those whose primary matter of policy concern lies in their income insufficiency from 
those who appear vulnerable in light of a wider range of insufficiencies and impediments to a full 
participation in the social, economic and cultural life of the community in which they live. However, our 
results suggest that policies directed at one specific type of deprivation may also be effective in breaking the 
cycle leading to deprivation of the other form. As the identification of the various groups of vulnerable 
individuals is often difficult in practice, the existence of these spillover effects may be good news for the 
policy markers committed to combat all forms of human suffering.  
We have presented our definition of social exclusion as a reasonable compromise between the 
theoretical underpinnings of the concept and the data practically available for its implementation. Moreover, 
a number of robustness checks relative to the construction of our social exclusion measure increased our 
confidence in the existence of a dynamic interrelationship between income poverty and social exclusion. At 
the same time, we stressed that, until a more widely accepted way of measuring social exclusion becomes 
available in the empirical literature, our results should be taken as suggestive only of the existence of 
significant spillover effects between income poverty and social exclusion. Future research should therefore 
continue to investigate how the two processes shape each other at the individual level in a dynamic context. 
 
Page 28 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 27
References 
Addabbo T. (2000), “Poverty Dynamics: Analysis of Household Income in Italy”, Labor 14(1), 119-144.  
Alessie, R., Hochguertel, S., and van Soest, A. (2004) “Ownership of stocks and mutual funds: a panel data 
analysis” The review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 86, pp. 783-796. 
Arulampalam, W. (1999) “A note on estimated coefficients in random effects probit models”, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, pp. 597-602. 
Atkinson, A.B. (1998) “Social Exclusion, Poverty and Unemployment”, in Atkinson, A.B. and Hills J. (eds.), 
Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity, CASEpaper 4, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 
London School of Economics.   
Brandolini, A., and D’Alessio, G. (1998). “Measuring well-being in the functioning space”, mimeo, Bank of 
Italy, Rome. 
Biewen, M. (2006): Who are the chronic poor? An econometric analysis of chronic poverty in Germany, 
Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 13, pp. 31 – 62. 
Biewen, M. (2007): “Measuring state dependence in individual poverty status with non-exogenous 
employment status and non-exogenous household composition”, paper presented a the workshop on 
“Dynamic Analysis using Panel data: Applications to poverty and Social exclusion”, June 2007, Collegio 
Carlo Alberto, Torino.  
Borooah, V. (2007) “Bridging the gap between the measurement of poverty and of deprivation”, Applied 
Economics, Volume 40(3), pp. 349 – 356. 
Bossert, W., C. D’Ambrosio and V. Peragine (2007), “Deprivation and Social Exclusion”, Economica, 
forthcoming. 
Burchardt, T. (2000) Social exclusion: Concept and evidence. In: Gordon, D., Townsend, P. (eds.) Breadline 
Europe: The Measurement of Poverty, pp. 385–406. Policy, Bristol. 
Cantό Sanchez, O. (2002), Climbing out of poverty, Falling back in: Low incomes' stability in Spain, 
Applied Economics, 34, pp. 1903-1916. 
Cappellari L and Jenkins SP (2004), “Modelling Low Income Transitions”, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 19, 5, pp. 593-610.  
Page 29 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 28
Chakravarty, S and D’ambrosio, C. and. (2006), “The Measurement of Social Exclusion”, Review of Income 
and Wealth, 52-3, pp. 377-398 . 
Commissione d’Indagine sull’Esclusione Sociale (2002), “Rapporto sulle Politiche contro la Povertà e 
l’Esclusione Sociale”, Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. 
D’ambrosio, C., Deutsch J. and Silber J. (2008) “Multidimensional Approaches to Poverty Measurement: An 
Empirical Analysis of Poverty in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, based on the European Panel”, 
Applied Economics, forthcoming. 
Deutsch J. and Silber J (2005). “Measuring Multidimensional Poverty: An empirical Comparison Of Various 
Approaches”, Review of Income and Wealth, 51, 1, 145-174.  
Devicienti F (2002), “Poverty Persistence In Britain: A Multivariate Analysis Using The BHPS, 1991-1997”, 
Journal Of Economics, Suppl. 9: 1-34.  
Devicienti F. and Gualtieri V. (2006), Dinamiche e persistenza della povertà in Italia: Un’ analisi con 
microdati panel di fonte ECHP. in G. Rovati (eds) “Le dimensioni della povertà”, Carocci Editore, 2006. 
European Commission (1992) Towards a Europe of Solidarity – Intensifying the Fight Against Social 
Exclusion, Fostering Integration (COM(92) 542), Brussels. 
European Commission (1993) Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The Challenge and Ways 
Forward into the 21st Century – White Paper (COM(93) 700), Brussels. 
Eurostat, (1996), The European community household panel, Vol. 1, Vol2. 
Eurostat (2000), Social Exclusion in the EU Member States, Statistics in Focus. Population and Social 
Conditions, Theme 3, No1. 
Ferrera M. (2005) “Welfare State Reform in Southern Europe. Fighting Poverty and Social Exclusion in 
Italy, Portugal and Greece”, (eds.), Routledge, London. 
Jenkins, S.P. (2000) “Modelling Household Income Dynamics”, Journal Of Population Economics, 13 (4). 
Heckman J.J. (1981a). “Heterogeneity and state dependence”, in S. Rosen (ed.) Studies in Labor Markets, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press (for NBER).  
Heckman J.J. (1981b). “The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial conditions in 
estimating a discrete time - discrete data stochastic process”, in C.F. Manski and D. McFadden (eds.) 
Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Page 30 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 29
Heitmueller, A., and Michaud, P.C. (2006) “Informal care and employment in England: evidence from the 
British Household Panel Survey”, Discussion Paper No. 2010, IZA 
Lee, P. and A. Murie (1999), “Spatial and Social Division within British Cities: Beyond Residualisation”, 
Housing Studies 14(5): 625-640. 
Miranda, A. (2007) “Do migrant networks affect education in source countries? Evidence from urban 
Mexico”, mimeo 
Perry, B. (2002) “ The mismatch between income measures and direct outcome measures of poverty”, Social 
Policy Journal of New Zealand, 19, pp. 101-127. 
Pérez-Mayo J (2005) “Identifying deprivation profiles in Spain: a new approach”, Applied Economics, 
Volume 37(8), Pages 943 – 955. 
Poggi A. (2007a), Does persistence of social exclusion exist in Spain?, Journal of Economic Inequality, 5(1):  
53-72. 
Poggi A. (2007b), “Social exclusion mobility in Spain, 1994-2001”, Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 
14. 
Poggi, A., and Ramos, X. (2007) “Empirical modelling of deprivation transmission (contagion) among social 
exclusion dimensions (using MCMC methods)” , IZA DP No. 2614 
Sen A.K. (2000), Social exclusion: concept, application, and scrutiny, Social Development Papers No. 1, 
Office of Environment and Social Development, Asian Development Bank, January. 
Stewart (2005) “The Inter-related Dynamics of Unemployment and Low-Pay Employment”, forthcoming in 
Journal of Applied Econometrics.  
Tsakloglou, P. and F. Papadopoulos (2002a), “Identifying population groups at high risk of social exclusion; 
evidence from the ECHP”, in R.J.A. Muffels, P. Tsakloglou and D.G. Meyes (eds.), Social Exclusion in 
European Welfare States. Cheltenham; Edward Elgar, Chapter 6. 
Tsakloglou, P. and Papadopoulos, F. (2002b) “Poverty, material deprivation and multi-dimensional 
disadvantage during four life stage: Evidence from ECHP”, in C. Heady (eds) “Poverty and social 
exclusion in Europe”, Cheltenham ; Northampton, MA : E. Elgar 
Train K.E. (2003). Discrete Choice Models with Simulations, Cambridge Univ Press.   
Page 31 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 30
Whelan, C.T., R. Layte and B. Maitre (2002), “Persistent deprivation in the European Union”, Journal of 
Applied Social Science Studies, 122. 
Whelan, C.T., Layte, R., and Maitre, B. (2004) “Understanding the Mismatch between income poverty and 
deprivation: a dynamic comparative analysis”, European Sociological Review, Vol. 20, pp.287-302 
Wooldridge J.M. (2005) “Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem in Dynamic, Nonlinear Panel 
Data Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity”, Journal Of Applied Econometrics, 20, 39-54. 
 
Page 32 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 31
 Tables: 
 
Table 1. Social exclusion dimensions 
Basic needs fulfilment (BASIC) 
Not eating meat or the like every second day  
Being unable to buy new, rather than second hand clothes 
Being unable to pay bills, rent, etc.  
To reach a certain quality of life (QUALITY) 
Car or van  
Color TV  
Video recorder  
Telephone  
Paying for a week's annual holiday  
Having friends or family for a drink/meal at least once a month 
Having an adequate house (HOUSING) 
Not having an indoor flushing toilet  
Not having hot running water  
Not having enough space  
Not having enough light  
Not having an adequate heating facility  
Not having damp walls, floors, foundation... 
Not having a leaky roof  
Not having rot in the window frames, floors  
Ability to have social relationships (SOCIAL) 
Frequency of talk to the neighbours  
Frequency of meeting people  
Member of any club (sport club, neighbourhood group, party, etc.) 
Being healthy and able to work  (HEALTH) 
Being hampered in daily activities by any physical or mental health 
problem  
Not search for a job because own illness, injury and incapacitation 
Living in a safe and clean environment (LIVING) 
Noise from neighbours or outside  
Pollution, crime or other environmental problems caused by traffic or 
industry 
Vandalism or crime in the area  
 
Table 2. Proportion of deprived, excluded and poor individuals 
Year Basic Quality Housing Social Healthy Living 
Income  
Poverty  
(poor) 
Social 
Exclusion  
(se) 
Both poor  
and se No. Obs. 
1994 7.36% 2.11% 4.43% 17.65% 1.60% 20.79% 22.34% 9.18% 3.65% 14,157 
1995 7.68% 2.54% 3.62% 16.22% 1.41% 20.66% 21.70% 10.48% 4.53% 14,112 
1996 7.27% 1.51% 2.94% 11.24% 1.35% 24.04% 21.67% 8.76% 4.12% 13,982 
1997 6.31% 1.36% 2.12% 11.28% 1.36% 23.61% 20.04% 8.40% 3.84% 12,954 
1998 5.07% 1.19% 3.12% 11.76% 1.37% 18.16% 18.13% 7.09% 3.20% 12,387 
1999 5.17% 1.10% 2.95% 10.74% 1.23% 18.45% 18.54% 6.67% 3.26% 11,882 
2000 4.38% 0.81% 2.77% 9.53% 1.27% 18.01% 17.59% 5.80% 2.69% 11,184 
2001 5.78% 0.66% 2.98% 9.32% 1.23% 15.88% 18.44% 5.83% 2.35% 10,195 
1994-01 6.22% 1.46% 3.14% 12.46% 1.36% 20.17% 19.97% 7.93% 3.52% 100,853 
Note: Unbalanced sample.  
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Table 3. Number of years in poverty and social exclusion (Proportion of individuals) 
No. of years  poverty se 
0 52.00 76.65 
1 13.05 12.16 
2 7.19 4.58 
3 6.31 2.44 
4 4.28 1.35 
5 4.17 0.95 
6 3.83 0.67 
7 5.01 0.70 
8 4.17 0.50 
Note: Balanced panel of 5,860 individuals, for a 
total of 41,020 person-year observations. 
 
 
Table 4. Probability of deprivation in current year, conditional on past deprivation 
Prob(poor t | poor t-1) 65.26 
Prob (poor t | non poor t-1) 8.07 
Prob (se t | se t-1) 42.5 
Prob (se t | not se t-1) 3.49 
  
Prob (poor t | se t-1) 44.98 
Prob (poor t | not se t-1) 18.16 
Prob (se t | poor t-1) 14.42 
Prob (se t | not poor t-1) 4.37 
  
Prob (poor t | poor t-2) 59.74 
Prob (se t | se t-2) 36.71 
Note: Raw probabilities in the unbalanced panel.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Sample composition (averaged over the sample period)  
mean age 37.66 North–west 10.2 
mean household dependent members 1.91 Lombardia 15 
mean household working members 1.88 North-east 10.93 
  Emilia Romagna 5.71 
Individual attributes % Centre 9.95 
Female 50.13 Lazio 9.51 
Education  Abruzzo-molise 3 
   High 7.87 Campania 10.39 
   Medium 39.09 Sud 12.34 
   Low 53.04 Sicilia 9.63 
Living in couple 77.19 Sardegna 3.34 
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Table 6. Estimates of the probit model for the probability of being poor 
Poverty pooled probit model Init. Cond: Heckman Init. Cond: Wooldridge 
  Coef.  
Robust 
Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
se(t-1) 0.3387 ** 0.0311 0.2784 ** 0.0408 0.2153 ** 0.0409 
poor(t-1) 1.5025 ** 0.0185 0.7407 ** 0.0270 0.7806 ** 0.0254 
se (1)       0.3319 ** 0.0528 
poor (1)       0.9191 ** 0.0347 
Female 0.0340  0.0173 0.0504  0.0338 0.0456  0.0288 
Age -0.0030 ** 0.0010 -0.0056 ** 0.0019 -0.0047 ** 0.0018 
medium education 0.3594 ** 0.0479 0.6170 ** 0.0922 0.4617 ** 0.0757 
low education 0.6885 ** 0.0469 1.2526 ** 0.0909 0.8956 ** 0.0745 
Lombardia -0.0904  0.0530 -0.1469  0.0978 -0.0894  0.0824 
North-east -0.0669  0.0511 -0.1111  0.0907 -0.1212  0.0801 
Emilia Romagna -0.1755 * 0.0732 -0.3803 ** 0.1271 -0.1784  0.1113 
Centre 0.0239  0.0492 0.0631  0.0904 -0.0040  0.0778 
Lazio 0.2975 ** 0.0558 0.5159 ** 0.1049 0.3596 ** 0.0902 
Abruzzo-molise 0.2683 ** 0.0509 0.5101 ** 0.0947 0.2810 ** 0.0820 
Campania 0.5402 ** 0.0450 0.9495 ** 0.0833 0.6546 ** 0.0727 
Sud 0.5752 ** 0.0438 1.0721 ** 0.0811 0.6867 ** 0.0708 
Sicilia 0.6555 ** 0.0455 1.1959 ** 0.0845 0.8042 ** 0.0741 
Sardegna 0.5408 ** 0.0476 0.9779 ** 0.0886 0.6587 ** 0.0777 
active members -0.0381 ** 0.0096 -0.0590 ** 0.0148 -0.1273 ** 0.0213 
marital status -0.0988 ** 0.0232 -0.1752 ** 0.0379 -0.2489 ** 0.0618 
depend. members 0.1250 ** 0.0080 0.1645 ** 0.0130 0.0639 ** 0.0197 
year dummies yes   yes   yes   
longit average variables no   no   yes   
constant -2.2590 ** 0.0762 -2.9333 ** 0.1388 -2.8477 ** 0.1234 
ασ  
   0.9201 ** 0.0129 0.7064 ** 0.0150 
log-likelihood -13342.7   -15400.7   -12572.5   
no. observations 41020   46880   41020   
Notes:  robust standard errors are displayed, to account for individual repeated observations in the panel. (**) statistically significant 
at 1% level; (*) statistically significant at 5% level. Estimates of the initial conditions are reported in Table 9. 
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Table 7. Estimates of the probit model for the probability of being socially excluded 
Social Exclusion pooled probit model Init. Cond: Heckman Init. Cond: Wooldridge 
  Coef.  
Robust 
Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
se(t-1) 1.4452 ** 0.0383 0.5468 ** 0.0424 0.6982 ** 0.0377 
poor(t-1) 0.3109 ** 0.0269 0.2881 ** 0.0367 0.2127 ** 0.0373 
se(1) ---  --- ---  --- 0.8713 ** 0.0538 
poor(1) ---  --- ---  --- 0.2008 ** 0.0437 
female -0.0416  0.0267 -0.0671  0.0418 -0.0560  0.0347 
age 0.0006  0.0016 -0.0015  0.0024 -0.0013  0.0021 
medium education 0.1012  0.0655 0.1637  0.0994 0.1092  0.0816 
low education 0.3053 ** 0.0639 0.5330 ** 0.0976 0.3587 ** 0.0799 
Lombardia -0.0078  0.0687 -0.0570  0.1086 -0.0361  0.0901 
North-east -0.1400 * 0.0700 -0.2649 * 0.1134 -0.2020 * 0.0926 
Emilia Romagna -0.0361  0.0778 -0.0482  0.1416 0.0229  0.1135 
Centre -0.1759 * 0.0764 -0.3773 ** 0.1165 -0.2498 ** 0.0935 
Lazio 0.1827 ** 0.0696 0.4089 ** 0.1227 0.2650 ** 0.1005 
Abruzzo-molise -0.2959 ** 0.0788 -0.4779 ** 0.1316 -0.3584 ** 0.1088 
Campania 0.1027  0.0620 0.2147 * 0.1013 0.1109  0.0844 
Sud 0.3671 ** 0.0561 0.6436 ** 0.0959 0.4486 ** 0.0796 
Sicilia 0.2370 ** 0.0620 0.4006 ** 0.1000 0.2527 ** 0.0848 
Sardegna 0.0992  0.0666 0.1974  0.1070 0.1178  0.0911 
active members -0.0225  0.0147 -0.0165  0.0193 -0.0176  0.0282 
marital status -0.0570  0.0343 -0.0823  0.0490 -0.2046 * 0.0849 
depend. members -0.0107  0.0126 -0.0242  0.0164 -0.0622 * 0.0263 
dear dummies yes   yes   yes   
longit average variables no   no   yes   
constant -1.9046 ** 0.1045 -2.4226 ** 0.1602 -2.2196 ** 0.1381 
ασ  
   0.9542 ** 0.0166 0.6994 ** 0.0167 
log-likelihood -7178.23   -8228.38   -6780.48   
no. observations 41020   46880   41020   
Notes:  robust standard errors are displayed, to account for individual repeated observations in the panel. (**) statistically 
significant at 1% level; (*) statistically significant at 5% level. Estimates of the initial conditions are reported in in Table 9. 
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Table 8: Bivariate probit model: assessment of the initial condition   
    Bivariate Pooled Model   Specification 1a:   Wooldridge estimator Specification 1b:   Heckman initial cond. 
  Poverty Social exclusion Poverty Social exclusion Poverty Social exclusion 
  coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.  s.err. coeff.  s.err. 
se(t-1) 0.340 ** 0.032 1.445 ** 0.038 0.107 * 0.047 0.576 ** 0.043 0.120 ** 0.041 0.572 ** 0.042 
poor(t-1) 1.503 ** 0.024 0.314 ** 0.027 0.707 ** 0.028 0.092 * 0.045 0.722 ** 0.026 0.108 * 0.046 
se(1)          0.402 ** 0.058 1.017 ** 0.068       
poor(1)          1.006 ** 0.041 0.304 ** 0.052       
female 0.034  0.020 -0.042  0.027 0.056  0.032 -0.029  0.040 0.069 * 0.034 -0.061  0.041 
age -0.003 * 0.001 0.001  0.002 -0.005 * 0.002 0.000  0.002 -0.006 ** 0.002 -0.001  0.002 
medium education 0.359 ** 0.060 0.100  0.066 0.505 ** 0.083 0.144  0.096 0.641 ** 0.086 0.191 * 0.097 
low education 0.688 ** 0.058 0.303 ** 0.064 0.978 ** 0.082 0.434 ** 0.095 1.288 ** 0.088 0.577 ** 0.095 
Lombardia -0.090  0.060 -0.009  0.069 -0.090  0.090 -0.052  0.106 -0.101  0.097 0.008  0.110 
North-east -0.067  0.061 -0.139 * 0.070 -0.126  0.088 -0.216 * 0.108 -0.105  0.094 -0.260 * 0.118 
Emilia Romagna -0.173 * 0.086 -0.037  0.078 -0.201  0.122 0.029  0.133 -0.325 * 0.135 -0.059  0.154 
Centre 0.023  0.057 -0.176 * 0.076 0.021  0.086 -0.239 * 0.108 0.075  0.095 -0.292 * 0.115 
Lazio 0.296 ** 0.063 0.182 ** 0.070 0.370 ** 0.098 0.297 * 0.119 0.566 ** 0.110 0.435 ** 0.134 
Abruzzo-molise 0.267 ** 0.058 -0.300 ** 0.079 0.300 ** 0.090 -0.416 ** 0.130 0.483 ** 0.099 -0.442 ** 0.145 
Campania   0.539 ** 0.052 0.099  0.062 0.692 ** 0.081 0.149  0.099 0.986 ** 0.087 0.275 ** 0.108 
Sud 0.572 ** 0.050 0.363 ** 0.056 0.729 ** 0.079 0.507 ** 0.095 1.108 ** 0.086 0.687 ** 0.105 
Sicilia 0.655 ** 0.053 0.233 ** 0.062 0.845 ** 0.082 0.308 ** 0.100 1.238 ** 0.088 0.473 ** 0.107 
Sardegna 0.540 ** 0.055 0.096  0.067 0.699 ** 0.087 0.155  0.108 1.047 ** 0.091 0.265 * 0.115 
active members -0.038 ** 0.011 -0.023  0.015 -0.128 ** 0.022 -0.014  0.029 -0.057 ** 0.013 -0.027  0.017 
marital status -0.098 ** 0.026 -0.057  0.034 -0.261 ** 0.063 -0.216 * 0.088 -0.191 ** 0.035 -0.111 * 0.046 
depend. members 0.125 ** 0.009 -0.010  0.013 0.069 ** 0.020 -0.061 * 0.027 0.171 ** 0.012 -0.028  0.015 
constant -2.258 ** 0.091 -1.901 ** 0.104 -2.992 ** 0.137 -2.422 ** 0.164 -2.988 ** 0.133 -2.465 ** 0.161 
year dummies Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   
longit. averaged variables xit No   No    Yes    Yes   No   No   ρ  0.122 ** 0.017       0.053 * 0.026       0.056 * 0.026    
1ασ  
           0.824 ** 0.024     0.960 ** 0.027 
   
2ασ  
           0.910 ** 0.036       1.018 ** 0.038 
   
αρ  
            0.267 ** 0.045       0.323 ** 0.033 
   
log-likelihood -20497      -19299§      -23592      
no. observations 41020      41020      46880      
Notes:  robust standard errors are displayed, to account for individual repeated observations in the panel. (**) statistically significant at 1% level; (*) statistically significant at 5% 
level; estimates of the initial conditions are reported in Table 9. § The log-likelihood of the bivariate probit at t=1 is equal to -4256. 
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 Table 9: Heckman estimates of the initial condition equations   
      univariate model     univariate model                          bivariate model: Specification 2b 
  Estimates Init. Cond. Heckman Estimates Init. Cond. Heckman Estimates Init. Cond. Heckman Estimates Init. Cond. Heckman 
 Poverty Social Exclusion Poverty Social Exclusion 
  Coef.   Std.Err. Coef.   Std.Err. Coef.   Std.Err. Coef.   Std.Err. 
Female 0.0390  0.0496 -0.0359  0.0602 0.055  0.050 -0.036  0.061 
Age -0.0012  0.0032 0.0058  0.0038 -0.001  0.003 0.006  0.004 
Medium education 0.5414 ** 0.1270 0.2425  0.1473 0.551 ** 0.127 0.243  0.149 
Low education 1.1129 ** 0.1252 0.5413 ** 0.1441 1.122 ** 0.127 0.537 ** 0.147 
Lombardia -0.1310  0.1497 0.0536  0.1487 -0.093  0.151 0.079  0.151 
North-east 0.2186  0.1378 -0.2062  0.1561 0.227  0.141 -0.212  0.160 
Emilia Romagna -0.4784 * 0.2117 -0.2861  0.2117 -0.436 * 0.213 -0.299  0.213 
Centre 0.4369 ** 0.1348 -0.5433 ** 0.1723 0.453 ** 0.135 -0.493 ** 0.170 
Lazio 0.5524 ** 0.1601 0.3936 * 0.1671 0.581 ** 0.166 0.401 ** 0.167 
Abruzzo-molise 0.8334 ** 0.1430 -0.5137 ** 0.1948 0.815 ** 0.145 -0.517 ** 0.200 
Campania 0.9363 ** 0.1298 0.2363  0.1411 0.953 ** 0.132 0.247  0.144 
Sud 1.1935 ** 0.1262 0.4280 ** 0.1334 1.201 ** 0.129 0.418 ** 0.135 
Sicilia 1.2813 ** 0.1312 0.2074  0.1436 1.299 ** 0.134 0.201  0.150 
Sardegna 1.0579 ** 0.1379 0.0571  0.1565 1.104 ** 0.140 0.073  0.161 
Active members -0.0649 * 0.0259 0.0027  0.0315 -0.067 * 0.026 -0.010  0.031 
Marital status -0.2331 ** 0.0689 -0.2257 ** 0.0814 -0.246 ** 0.073 -0.241 ** 0.080 
Depend. members 0.1238 ** 0.0216 -0.0001  0.0265 0.123 ** 0.022 -0.016  0.028 
Constant -2.4547 ** 0.2051 -2.2683 ** 0.2349 -2.470 ** 0.202 -2.224 ** 0.241 
eρ  
         -0.040  0.0544 
11λ  0.8968 ** 0.0470 ---  ---    1.369 ** 0.216 
12λ  ---  --- ---  ---    0.009  0.041 
21λ  ---  --- ---  ---    0.103 ** 0.052 
22λ  ---  --- 0.6988 ** 0.0550    0.782 ** 0.103 
Note:  (**) statistically significant at 1% level; (*) statistically significant at 5% level 
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Table 10: Estimates of the Dynamic random effect bivariate probit model (Wooldridge estimator) 
  Specification 1a Specification 2 Specification 3 
  Poverty Social exclusion poverty Social exclusion poverty Social exclusion 
  coeff.   s.err. coeff.  s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. coeff.   s.err. 
se(t-1) 0.107 * 0.047 0.576 ** 0.043 0.102 * 0.048 0.580 ** 0.043 0.296 ** 0.051 1.035 ** 0.049 
poor(t-1) 0.707 ** 0.028 0.092 * 0.045 0.719 ** 0.028 0.085  0.045 1.027 ** 0.034 0.258 ** 0.049 
se(t-2)                   0.145 ** 0.047 0.712 ** 0.046 
poor(t-2)                   0.552 ** 0.031 0.120 ** 0.045 
se(1) 0.402 ** 0.058 1.017 ** 0.068 0.401 ** 0.059 1.016 ** 0.068 0.179 ** 0.047 0.362 ** 0.055 
poor(1) 1.006 ** 0.041 0.304 ** 0.052 1.036 ** 0.041 0.307 ** 0.052 0.466 ** 0.040 0.068  0.044 
female 0.056  0.032 -0.029  0.04 0.057  0.032 -0.029  0.040 0.033  0.023 -0.052  0.029 
age -0.005 * 0.002 -0.000  0.002 -0.008 ** 0.002 -0.002  0.002 -0.004 ** 0.001 -0.001  0.002 
medium education 0.505 ** 0.083 0.144  0.096 0.551 ** 0.085 0.150  0.096 0.359 ** 0.064 0.080  0.072 
low education 0.978 ** 0.082 0.434 ** 0.095 1.035 ** 0.084 0.430 ** 0.095 0.660 ** 0.065 0.236 ** 0.071 
Lombardia -0.090  0.090 -0.052  0.106 -0.129  0.090 -0.045  0.104 -0.113  0.067 -0.223 ** 0.081 
North-east -0.126  0.088 -0.216 * 0.108 -0.096  0.087 -0.215 * 0.107 -0.15  0.095 -0.052  0.099 
Emilia Romagna -0.201  0.122 0.029  0.133 -0.314 * 0.122 0.020  0.132 -0.006  0.065 -0.212 ** 0.081 
Centre 0.021  0.086 -0.239 * 0.108 0.055  0.085 -0.227 * 0.107 0.308 ** 0.074 0.013  0.088 
Lazio 0.370 ** 0.098 0.297 * 0.119 0.399 ** 0.099 0.282 * 0.118 0.224 ** 0.068 -0.269 ** 0.093 
Abruzzo-molise 0.300 ** 0.090 -0.416 ** 0.13 0.352 ** 0.090 -0.414 ** 0.128 0.484 ** 0.061 -0.038  0.072 
Campania  0.692 ** 0.081 0.149  0.099 0.778 ** 0.080 0.151  0.098 0.485 ** 0.060 0.223 ** 0.068 
Sud 0.729 ** 0.079 0.507 ** 0.095 0.83 ** 0.078 0.513 ** 0.094 0.623 ** 0.063 0.159 * 0.071 
Sicilia 0.845 ** 0.082 0.308 ** 0.1 0.948 ** 0.082 0.328 ** 0.099 0.476 ** 0.065 0.093  0.076 
Sardegna 0.699 ** 0.087 0.155  0.108 0.802 ** 0.086 0.160  0.106 -0.152 ** 0.023 -0.007  0.030 
active members -0.128 ** 0.022 -0.014  0.029          -0.153 * 0.067 -0.227 * 0.092 
marital status -0.261 ** 0.063 -0.216 * 0.088          0.038  0.022 -0.066 * 0.029 
depend. Members 0.069 ** 0.020 -0.061 * 0.027          0.099 ** 0.028 -0.024  0.037 
constant -2.992 ** 0.137 -2.422 ** 0.164 -2.719 ** 0.124 -2.555 ** 0.148 -2.402 ** 0.107 -2.114 ** 0.121 
year dummies  yes   yes      yes     yes     yes   yes     
longit. averaged xit  yes   yes      yes     yes     yes   yes     ρ  0.053 * 0.026    0.045  0.026     0.111 ** 0.029      
1ασ  0.824 ** 0.024    0.844 ** 0.024     0.375 ** 0.039 
     
2ασ  0.910 ** 0.036       0.908 ** 0.036       0.341 ** 0.051 
      
αρ  0.267 ** 0.045       0.281 ** 0.045       -0.317   0.207       
log-likelihood -19299      -19474      -15836      
no. observations 41020      41020      35160      
Notes:  robust standard errors are displayed, to account for individual repeated observations in the panel. (**) statistically significant at 1% level; (*) statistically significant at 5% level; 
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Table 11. Robustness Analysis 
Model 1 Model 2 
Robustness 
analysis : different cut-
off points  
 Poverty 
  
  
 Social Exclusion: an individual 
is excluded if deprived in at 
least 1 dimension 
 Poverty 
 
 
 Social Exclusion: an individual 
is excluded if  deprived in at 
least 3 dimension 
  Coef   SE coef   SE  coef   SE coef   SE  
Constant -2.483 ** 0.1095 -1.260 ** 0.0859  -2.403 ** 0.109 -2.921 ** 0.296  
poor(t-1) 1.012 ** 0.0334 0.106 ** 0.0357  1.014 ** 0.034 0.330 ** 0.085  
se(t-1) 0.154 ** 0.0337 0.775 ** 0.0280  0.118  0.101 1.180 ** 0.109  
poor(t-2) 0.541 ** 0.0308 0.097 ** 0.0326  0.537 ** 0.031 -0.007  0.083  
se(t-2) 0.059 * 0.0306 0.424 ** 0.0255  0.588 ** 0.094 0.829 ** 0.107  
poor(1) 0.497 ** 0.0397 -0.059  0.0343  0.503 ** 0.040 0.326 ** 0.087  
se(1) 0.069 ** 0.0309 0.552 ** 0.0335  0.288 ** 0.090 0.787 ** 0.153  
covariates yes  yes yes  yes  yes  yes yes  yes  
ρ 0.078 ** 0.0207     0.159 ** 0.050     
1ασ  0.402 ** 0.0368     0.402 ** 0.037     
2ασ  0.522 ** 0.0292     0.489 ** 0.089     
ρα  -0.124   0.0971     0.141   0.187     
               
Model 3 Model 4 Robustness 
analysis : alternative 
definitions of social 
exclusion y1= income poverty y2= se_social y1= income poverty y2= se_econ 
 Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
cons -2.4432 ** 0.1090 -1.3678 ** 0.0911 -2.3978 ** 0.1079 -2.1335 ** 0.1209 
y1(t-1) 1.0284 ** 0.0344 0.0449  0.0387 1.0013 ** 0.0336 0.2782 ** 0.0437 
y2(t-1) 0.0511  0.0364 0.7826 ** 0.0290 0.3840 ** 0.0462 1.0665 ** 0.0443 
y1(t-2) 0.5520 ** 0.0314 0.0683 * 0.0349 0.5324 ** 0.0310 0.0940 * 0.0407 
y2(t-2) 0.0677 * 0.0327 0.4148 ** 0.0268 0.1019 * 0.0413 0.6111 ** 0.0411 
y1(1) 0.4914 ** 0.0408 -0.0606  0.0370 0.4810 ** 0.0395 0.1072 * 0.0411 
y2(1) 0.0450  0.0329 0.6427 ** 0.0366 0.1811 ** 0.0398 0.3482 ** 0.0475 
Covariates yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  Yes 
ρ 0.0528 * 0.0223    0.12858 ** 0.026    
1ασ  0.3945 ** 0.0395    0.39062 ** 0.0379    
2ασ  0.5640 ** 0.0296    0.35322 ** 0.0469    
ρα  -0.1435  0.1043    0.00413  0.1547    
Notes: “se_social”  =  social exclusion omitting the dimensions BASIC, QUALITY, and HOUSING; “se_econ”    = BASIC + QUALITY + HOUSING 
Page 40 of 40
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 39
Table 12: Conditional Probability of deprivation status in t, conditional on deprivation status in t-1 
 
 
Probability of status in t 
Probability of status in t-1 Pooled bivariate probit model  Specification 1a Specification 2 Specification 3 
Poor Socially excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded 
0 0 0.089 0.032 0.154 0.049 0.153 0.049 0.123 0.032 
1 0 0.509 0.061 0.280 0.056 0.283 0.056 0.351 0.051 
0 1 0.150 0.326 0.170 0.103 0.168 0.104 0.174 0.169 
1 1 0.630 0.442 0.303 0.114 0.305 0.115 0.439 0.232 
 
 
 
Table 13: Conditional Probability of deprivation status in t, conditional on deprivation status in t-1 and t-2 
 
    Probability of status in t   
Probability of status 
in t-1 
Probability of status 
in t-2 Specification 3 
Poor 
Socially 
excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded Poor 
Socially 
excluded 
0 0 0 0  0.092 0.024  
1 1 0 0  0.405 0.212  
0 0 1 1  0.225 0.111  
1 1 1 1 0.633 0.486  
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